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Abstract
Firewalls inspect arriving packets according to a secu-
rity policy. The complexity of these policies can cause sig-
niﬁcant delays in the processing of packets, resulting in de-
graded performance, trafﬁc bottlenecks, and ultimately vi-
olating Quality of Service (QoS) constraints. As network
capacities continue to increase, the improvement of ﬁrewall
performance is a main concern.
One technique that dramatically reduces required pro-
cessing is the representation of security policies in software
with n-ary tries. This paper describes trie balancing meth-
ods that further improve performance by placing more fre-
quently used rules in high precedence positions which re-
quire fewer tuple comparisons. A proof of sorted trie in-
tegrity is presented along with experimental results show-
ing that on average, sorting reduces the number of compar-
isons by 27% as compared to the original trie and by 83%
as compared to a list representation. Sorting methods are
described in detail and their beneﬁts are demonstrated em-
pirically.
1. Introduction
Firewalls provide security by applying a security policy
to arriving packets. A policy is a list of rules which deﬁne
an action to perform on matching packets, such as accept or
deny [11]. Determining the appropriate action is typically
done in a ﬁrst-match fashion, dictated by the ﬁrst match-
ing rule appearing in the policy. Unfortunately, the time re-
quired to process packets increases as policies grow larger
and more complex. In high-speed environments ﬁrewalls
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quickly become bottlenecks and are susceptible to DoS at-
tacks [1, 5, 6]. Under these conditions, attackers simply
inundate the ﬁrewall with packets, delaying or preventing
legitimate trafﬁc from being processed.
Given these threats, research is focused on reducing
packet processing delay by improving either ﬁrewall hard-
ware or software. Hardware-based solutions include the
application of specialized systems and parallelization tech-
niques[1, 3, 8]. Thoughbeneﬁcial,hardwareimprovements
requirecostly upgradesandarenotapplicableto legacysys-
tems. Optimizing ﬁrewall software yields performance im-
provementswithout such costs.
Firewall software improvements include policy opti-
mization and efﬁcient policy implementations. Both meth-
ods reduce the number of comparisons per packet that are
required to determine an appropriate match. List reordering
is one such method that places more popular rules near the
beginning of the policy and maintains policy integrity [2].
Although determining the optimal rule order is NP-hard,
reordering can be accomplished using rule match probabil-
ities and a policy-DAG that ensures integrity [2]. This has
the effect of lowering the average number of comparisons
made per packet by making it more likely that a packet will
match rules near the beginning of the list. Reordering the
policy rules cannot improve the worst case number of com-
parisons, whichis always k·n wherek is the numberof rule
tuples and n is the number of rules.
Another software improvementis the use of non-listpol-
icy representations such as search or retrieval trees (tries)
that have the advantage of improving both the average and
worst case number of comparisons [9, 10]. In [4], a new
n-ary trie representationwas developedfor ﬁrewall policies
in which rules are groupedtogether based on similar tuples.
Groupingrulesinthisfashioneliminatesredundantcompar-
isons. Unlike traditional list implementations, it also allows
consideration of multiple rules at once. The worst case per-
formanceof thesestructureswas provenandexperimentally
demonstrated to be signiﬁcantly lower than an equivalentlist-representation, with a bound of 1/k number of compar-
isonsin the worstcase. In contrasttoothernon-linearrepre-
sentations, the policy trie maintains policy integrity, which
indicates the policy trie and list always arrive at the same
result for any given packet.
Although the policy trie has several advantages, it does
nottakeintoaccounttrafﬁcanalysis. Whilerulesortingpro-
vides some beneﬁt, a trie’s natural speciﬁc-to-general con-
struction prohibitsreorderingrules of differentspeciﬁcities,
limiting the overall effectiveness of sorting. This paper in-
corporates the use of policy-DAGs to guarantee the secu-
rity integrity of policy tries. We show that the speciﬁc-to-
general speciﬁcation can by altered with no compromise of
integrity given certain conditions determined by the DAG.
This allows us to sort a far greater number of rules resulting
in signiﬁcant performance gains given varying trafﬁc con-
ditions. Simulation results show the trie sorting method can
reduce the number of comparisons by over 27% as com-
pared to the original trie and by 83% as compared to an
equivalent list representation.
Section 2 discusses the formal modelingof security poli-
cies. Section 3 describes sorting list-based policies. Trie-
based representations are discussed in section 4, while trie
integrity and sorting methods are described in section 5.
Section 6 presents experimental results and section 7 con-
siders future research directions.
2. Firewall Policy Models
A ﬁrewall policy consists of an ordered list of rules, of-
ten implemented with a linked list. Based on packet header
information, each rule deﬁnes a subset of network trafﬁc
and an action to be carried out on packets in this set. Rules
are modeled as an ordered tuple, r =( r[1],r[2],...,r[k]).
Eachtuple representspossible valuesof packet headerﬁeld.
Internet trafﬁc is commonly deﬁned by ﬁve ﬁelds, Proto-
col, Source Address, Source Port, Destination Address, and
Destination Port. These ﬁelds can be fully speciﬁed or con-
tain wildcards ’*’ in standardpreﬁx format. Each tuple rep-
resents a ﬁnite set of values; therefore, the set of all possi-
ble packets is ﬁnite. Packets are also viewed as k-tuples,
d =( d[1],d[2],...,d[k]), however each tuple must be fully
speciﬁed.
As packets pass througha ﬁrewall, their header informa-
tion is sequentially compared to the ﬁelds of a rule. If the
packetisasubsetofarule,itissaidtobea matchandtheas-
sociatedaction,toacceptorreject,isperformed. Otherwise,
the packetis comparedto the next sequentialrule. A default
rule, or catch-all, is often placed at the end of a policy with
action reject. The addition of a default rule makes a policy
comprehensive, indicating that every packet will match at
least one rule. In the event that a packet matches multiple
rules, the action of the ﬁrst matching rule is taken. Policies
that employ this form of short-circuit evaluation are called
ﬁrst-match policies and account for the majority of ﬁrewall
implementations, including Netﬁlter’s iptables.
Using the rule model, a policy R is represented by an
ordered list of n rules: R = {r1,r 2,...,rn}. Two poli-
cies, R and R, are considered equal if the policies deﬁne
the same action for every packet d. In this case, policy R
is said to maintain the policy integrity of R. Sets of pack-
ets may match multiple rules, resulting in subset-superset
relationships. In ﬁrst-match policies, this forms the basis
of precedence relations that must be preserved in order to
maintain policy integrity.
2.1. Modeling Precedence using Policy-
DAGs
The precedence relationships between rules in a policy
canbemodeledwithaDirectedAcyclicalGraph(DAG)[7].
LetG =( R,E) bea policy-DAGfora policyR,w h e r ev e r -
tices arerulesand edgesE are the precedencerelationships.
Each edge introduces a constraint into the graph. A prece-
dence relationship, or edge, exists between rules ri and rj,
if i<j , the actions for each rule are different, and the
rules intersect. The intersection of two rules results in an
ordered set of tuples that collectively describes the packets
that match both rules. The rules ri and rj intersect if every
tuple of the resulting operation is non-empty. In contrast,
the rules ri and rj do not intersect, denoted as ri / ∩ rj,i fa t
least one tuple from the intesection operation is the empty
set. Note the intersection operation is symmetric: if ri in-
tersects rj,t h e nrj will intersect ri. The same is true for
rules that do not intersect.
Using the policy-DAG to maintain integrity, a linear ar-
rangementis soughtthatimprovesﬁrewall performance. As
depictedin ﬁgure1(b),a linear arrangementis a list ofDAG
vertices where all the successors of a vertex appear in se-
quence after that vertex. It follows that these arrangements
of a policy-DAG represent a rule order, obtained by read-
ing the vertices from left to right. This method of gener-
ating rule orders with a DAG has been proven to maintain
integrity in [2].
3. List-Based Policy Sorting
Given increasing network speeds and QoS requirements,
it is critical that a ﬁrewall quickly inspects packets. Re-
ordering policies to minimize the number of comparisons
required to ﬁlter a packet requires information not present
in the policy itself. Since some ﬁrewall rules have a higher
probability of matching packets than others, it is possible
to develop a distribution of the expected number of com-
parisons per rule, called a policy proﬁle. Over time, the
frequency of rule matches is collected, similar to a cacheSource Destination
No. Proto. IP Port IP Port Action Prob.
1 TCP 140.**130.* 80 deny 0.1
2 TCP 140.** * 80 accept 0.05
3 TCP 150.**120.* 90 accept 0.15
4 UDP 150.** * 3030 accept 0.3
5 * *** * deny 0.4
(a) Security policy.
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5
(b) Policy-DAG.
Figure 1. Example security policy and associated policy-DAG.
hit ratio. We deﬁne {p1,p 2,...,pn} to be the policy proﬁle,
where pi is the probability that a packet will match rule ri
ﬁrst. The average number of rule comparisons required is
E[n]=
n
i=1 i · pi and can be used to compare different
rule orderings.
Determining the optimal rule order is analogous to job-
shop scheduling and is thus NP-hard. However, a sim-
ple rule sorting heuristic was introduced in [2]. This al-
gorithm starts with the original policy and sorts neighbor-
ing rules based on non-increasing probabilities. The ex-
change of neighborsis governedby the constraints of a pol-
icy DAG, preserving precedence relationships. This tech-
nique reduces the average number of comparisons but does
not improve worst case performance, which is k · n tuple
comparisons. To address worst case performance, an im-
portantbenchmarkofaﬁrewall’s efﬁciency,newpolicyrep-
resentations are needed.
4. Policy Tries
In [4], a non-linear structure called a policy trie was de-
veloped to represent ﬁrewall security policies. This hierar-
chical structure has the ability to improve both the average
and worst case number of comparisons required to process
a packet. The policy trie T is a n-ary trie consisting of k
levels that store a security policy. Each level correspondsto
a rule tuple, except for the root. Nodes on each level store
tuple values from each rule. Unlike the standard binary trie
structure [7], a node must be able to have multiple children
in order to store a rule tuple rather than a single bit ﬁeld
as in [10]. Tuples at each level are organized from speciﬁc
to general. The trie construction takes into account prece-
dence relationships, introducingrule intersections to ensure
that the trie is equivalent to the original policy [4].
To process a packet d using the policy trie T (also re-
ferred to as searching T), each tuple of the packet is com-
pared with the children at the corresponding level, starting
with the root node. The search is conducted with a preorder
backtracking traversal. Consequently, the policy is evalu-
ated from speciﬁc to general. Once a complete root to leaf
path is found, the associated action is performed.
4.1. Push-Down Policy Tries
Sincepolicytriesrequirebacktrackingtheyhaveaworst-
case performance equal to that of a list representation [9].
Although the penalty for backtracking in an n-ary trie is
not as severe as a standard binary version, the conversion
to a non-backtracking trie reduces the number of tuple-
compares, and signiﬁcantly improvesthe worst case bound,
an objective of this representation.
A non-backtracking policy trie, referred to as a Push-
Down policy Trie (PDT), is created by replicating, or
pushing-down general rules in the original policy. A gen-
eral rule is a superset of at least one other rule in the pol-
icy. The push-downprocedurereplicatesmoregeneralrules
in subset sub-tries that would match the same packets as
the general rule. As a result, the union of the push-down
rules is a proper subset of the original rule. This process
maintainstheintegrityofthe trie whilereducingthenumber
of comparisons to 1/k of a list representation in the worst
case. The disadvantage of a PDT is the increased storage
required, which was proven to be n2 in the worst case [4].
5. Maintaining Policy Trie Integrity
The policy trie and PDT representations described in the
previous sections dramatically reduce the number of com-
parisons required to process a packet. Similar to policy list
sorting, the average number of comparisons can be further
improved by organizing the trie such that the more popu-
lar rules appear towards the left. Since constructing the trie
may reorder rules, building a trie from a sorted list may not
result in a sorted trie. Furthermore, exchanging sub-tries of
different speciﬁcities runs the risk of violating the integrity
of the associated policy. As a result, sorting tries and PDTs
is limited to comparisons between rules of the same speci-
ﬁcity (nodes that share the same parent node). In ﬁrewall
policiescontrollinga widevarietyofservicesandhosts, this
severely limits the effectiveness of sorting.
As with list-based policies, policy-DAGs can be used to
modelthe precedencerelationshipsbetweensub-tries. Sort-
ing based on the constraints of a DAG allows the potentialroot
TCP UDP *
140.* 150.* 150.* *
* * * *
130.* * 120.* * *
80 80 90 3030 *
p1 =0 .1 p2 =0 .05 p3 =0 .15 p4 =0 .3 p5 =0 .4
(a) Original policy trie.
root
UDP TCP *
150.* 150.* 140.* *
* * * *
* 120.* 130.* * *
3030 90 80 80 *
p4 =0 .3 p3 =0 .15 p1 =0 .05 p2 =0 .1 p5 =0 .4
(b) Sorted policy trie.
Figure 2. Original and sorted trie representations of the ﬁrewall rules given in ﬁgure 1(a). Dashed
edges represent precedence constraints between nodes that share the same parent.
reordering of rules of different speciﬁcities. Given a parent
node in the trie, a DAG is created with nodes represent-
ing each of the children’s sub-tries. These nodes are com-
prised of the most general root to leaf path beginning with
each respective child. Nodes are then compared to deter-
mine where subset relationships exist and edges are drawn
torepresentthe subsequentprecedencerelationships. Inﬁg-
ure 2(a) the children of the root node result in two edges
being drawn. Three rules in the TCP sub-trie and the one
rule in the UDP sub-trie intersect with the default rule in the
* sub-trie. Edges are drawn between TCP and *,a sw e l la s
betweenUDPand*. Incontrast,considerthechildrenofthe
TCP sub-trie. Rules in the 140.* sub-trie do not intersect
with rules in the 150.* sub-trie, so an edge is not drawn
between these siblings. Based on the DAG, the sub-tries
can be reordered to improve performance without violating
policy integrity, which is the basis of the sorting technique
described in section 5.2.
5.1. Ordering Policy Sub-Tries
Consider a policy trie T that containssibling nodesi and
j,w h e r eTi is the sub-trie with i as the root node and Tj
is a sub-trie with j as the root node. Let P(i) be the sum
of the probabilities of the rules contained in sub-trie of root
i, while C(i) denotes the number of comparisons required
to completely traverse sub-trie that has i as the root node,
equal to the number of branches. In order to reduce the av-
erage number of tuple comparisons, sub-tries that share the
same parent node should be ordered such that the P(i) val-
ues are non-ascending and higher match probabilities oc-
cur ﬁrst, from left to right. If sub-tries that share a par-
ent node have the same probability, P(i) equals P(j),t h e n
they should be arranged such that their C(·) values appear
in non-descending order.
Though reordering two rules may be beneﬁcial, the con-
straints of a policy DAG must be considered to ensure in-
tegrity. For example, take two neighboring sub-tries Ti and
Ti+1 that share the same parent node and are out of order.
Let Ti / ∩Tj indicate the rules in Ti do not intersect with the
rules in Tj (rs / ∩ rt,∀rs ∈ Ti,∀rt ∈ Tj). The two sub-tries
can be rotated about the parent if and only if Ti / ∩Ti+1 or if
the intersecting rules in sub-tries Ti and Ti+1 have the same
action. Similar to ﬁnding the linear sequence of a policy
DAG’s, these conditions maintain the policy trie integrity,
which is proven in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 Given a policy trie T, exchanging sub-tries
that have the same parent node based on the associated
policy-DAG maintains integrity.
Proof Consider two sub-tries, Ti and Tj, in a policy trie
T (i<j , without loss of generality). Ti and Tj may be
exchanged if there is no edge from any node in Ti to Tj.
By construction, the nodes in each set represent the most
general root to leaf path in their respective sub-trie and by
deﬁnition each node is a subset of its respective power set,
Ti or Tj.
Supposethatasetofpacketsdoverlapswithrulesinboth
Ti and Tj and the associated rule actions are different. The
reorderingofthesetwo ruleswouldresultina shadowing. Itfollows that, by deﬁnition of the DAG, there exists an edge
between these two rules. This violates the choice of Ti and
Tj. By contradiction, no such rules will exist and therefore,
no anomaly will be introduced into a sorted trie.
As in the problem of sorting a list-based policy, sorting a
policy trie can be viewed as job-shop scheduling [2]. Thus,
determining the optimal trie order can be considered NP-
hard.
5.2. A Trie Sorting Algorithm
Using the guidelines for maintaining integrity described
in the previous section, ﬁgure 3 presents a simple sorting
technique for policy tries or PDTs. The algorithm is in-
voked at the root and recursively sorts subtries by exchang-
ing neighbors based on match-probability and the number
of branches. Probabilities for nodes that are the result of an
intersection operation are assigned a value less than either
of the two original rules, as intersections deﬁne a smaller
set of packets than either parent. For all other sub-tries
the probabilityis the summation of the probabilities of their
leaves.
In the event that two probabilities are equal, the tie break
is decided by the number of branches in each trie, C(·).I n
this case, we want to make sure that tie break always results
in a better ordering, satisfying the inequality P(j) · C(j)+
P(i)·(C(i)+C(j)) <P(i)·C(i)+P(j)·(C(i)+C(j)),
where (P(j),C(j)) and (P(i),C(i)) are the cumulative
probabilities and branches for two sub-tries Ti and Tj.B y
construction, we know that P(i)=P(j) and C(i) >C (j).
Simpliﬁcation yields the true statement, C(j) <C (i), con-
ﬁrming that the inequality is satisﬁed.
Figure 2(b) depicts the same policy trie before and after
sorting. A trace of this example case has been omitted due
to space limitations. This algorithm can be implemented
by keeping buckets attached to rule action tuples to measure
therelativefrequencyofmatchesforindividualrules. Then,
basedonthisinformation,thetriescanberebalancedofﬂine
and implementedin the ﬁrewall. In simulations, sorted tries
providedsigniﬁcantlybetter processingtime to all trafﬁcb y
using DAG sorting to favor high frequency rules.
6. Experimental Results
The previous sections described how policy tries and
PDTs can be sorted to reduce the average number of tuple
comparisons. Simulation results in this section will mea-
sure the impact of the sorting method under realistic condi-
tions. Firewallpoliciesofsizesrangingfrom50to 500rules
were generated using a random-rule generator that ensured
anomalyfreepolicies andimitated the shapeof commonse-
curity policies. Sets of 10,000 packets were then generated
function sortTrie(trieNode m)
if(m is leaf node) return
done = false
while(!done)
done = true
for each child i of m that has a right neighboring sibling
if(P(i) <P(i +1 )AND (Ti / ∩ Ti+1 OR
action(Ti)==action(Ti+1))then
exchange Ti and Ti+1
done = false
endif
elseif(P(i)= =P(i +1 )AND C(i) >C (i +1 )
AND (Ti / ∩ Ti+1 OR action(Ti)==action(Ti+1))then
exchange Ti and Ti+1
done = false
endif
endfor
endwhile
for each child i of m
sortTrie(i)
endfor
endfunction
Figure 3. Trie sorting algorithm.
and skewed to favor random subsets of rules over others.
Of note, our trafﬁc generation algorithm mimics high ﬂow
to a small set of services, with no regard for their place-
ment in the policy. This is in contrast to the models used in
[4], which sought to produce DoS trafﬁc that exploited the
structure of linear and backtracking trie implementations.
Linear, back-tracking trie, and PDT implementations were
created and evaluatedin their original form. Then, based on
frequency analysis of the trafﬁc set, they were rebalanced
using DAG sorting and evaluated for comparison.
The results for the average and highest number of tuple-
comparisons are given in ﬁgure 4. As reported in [4],
the trie implementationsperformedsigniﬁcantly better than
the list, yielding a 81% reduction in the number of tuple-
comparisons required. In the case of back-tracking tries,
balancing resulted in 25% fewer comparisons than unbal-
anced tries. This is a result of the reduction of cumula-
tive delay by processing most packets faster. Not only does
the targeted trafﬁc stream beneﬁt, but those packets now re-
quiring more comparisonsalso beneﬁt. Though the average
number of comparisons decreased, the worst case perfor-
mance for single packet evaluation for sorted tries remained
the same. This is due to the nature of back-tracking search
in which all paths must be traversed for some packets no
matter what the order.
Push-Down Tries performed the best of all when sorted.
Thesorted PDT required83%fewercomparisononaverage
than a list and 27% fewer comparisons on average than an
unsorted PDT. In addition, the maximum number of com-
parisons in worst case situations decreased slightly, a func-
tion of their structural replication rules. As unpopular rules
are shufﬂed to the back of the PDT, they are not replicated50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
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Figure 4. The average and worst case number of tuple-comparisons required.
elsewhereinthePDT unlessneeded. Thiseffectivelyallows
certain rules to be excluded from most evaluations even in
worst-case situations.
7. Conclusions
A ﬁrewall’s fundamentaloperationis a single tuple com-
parison. The delay associated with processing a packet is
directly proportional to the number of comparisons made
by the ﬁrewall. A policy trie is a non-linear policy repre-
sentation that reduces the number of comparisons required
to determine the appropriate rule match [4]. Uniquely, pol-
icy tries are also proven to maintain policy integrity.
This paper improved the average case performance of
policy tries using sorting techniques. By organizingthe trie
such that more popular rules appear to the left in positions
reachedwith fewer tuple comparisons, processing overhead
was reduced signiﬁcantly. Since precedence relationships
preventarbitrarybranchreordering,a policy-DAGwasused
to guarantee that any such operations did not violate policy
integrity. Simulations indicate that this technique reduces
the average number of comparisons by 27% and 83% over
unsorted trie and list implementations, respectively. There-
fore, sorting is a simple method for improving performance
in trie-based ﬁrewalls.
Areas for furture research include faster sorting algo-
rithms for on-line application. Security can also be en-
hanced with connection state and packet audit information.
More research is needed to determine more accurate proba-
bilitydistributionsforpacketmatchinganddependencyper-
centages. Given this information, better algorithms can be
designed and tested with more realistic simulations.
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